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30 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for National
Intelligence Programs Evaluations

SUBJECT : PFIAB Memorandum on Suggested Procedural
Modifications Relating to Current
Intelligence Products

1. It is recommended that CIA firmly oppose the proposal before the PFIAB that all current intelligence issuances be coordinated within the community, on the ground that such a procedure would not be compatible with the DCI's responsibilities as the President's principal intelligence officer.

2. To discharge these responsibilities, it is essential that the DCI have the capability to provide the President and his principal aides with independent, unilateral analyses of current developments. As long as there are several functioning intelligence organizations within the Government, it is inevitable that there will be overlapping intelligence publications. This is certainly not an unhealthy situation. It is far better that the policy maker receive several pieces of paper on the same subject than that he get only one which glosses over differences of view or is watered down to the point where all can agree to it. But, since CIA alone among these organizations is not subordinate to a department of government with policy interests to guard and promote, it is to the DCI that the Executive Branch must and does look for the detached view. This basic element in the relationship between CIA and the President would be radically altered were the proposal in question to be adopted.

3. Implicit in the PFIAB memorandum is the view that CIA should not have the capability to do research on or publish on any subjects that are not specifically

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assigned to it as a "primary" responsibility. No such limitation is recognized in NSCID No. 3, however, which states that "Normally, the current intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and National Security Council." Inasmuch as the intelligence needs of the President and the National Security Council go across the board, CIA has developed the capability to produce current intelligence across the board, on any subject, be it political, economic, military, or scientific. It is, we feel, a fundamental responsibility of CIA to produce intelligence on this broad basis. PFIAB's description of "instances where the particular current intelligence product includes subject matters which are...outside the primary intelligence production responsibility of the preparing agency..." seems to us inappropriate when applied to a CIA product. It appears to us that the PFIAB fails to take into consideration the distinction both explicit and implicit in NSCID No. 3 between departmental intelligence and that produced by CIA. If all current intelligence were to be run through the same mill, as is being suggested, that distinction would disappear.

4. Part of the PFIAB argumentation appears to be based on the assumption that the coordinating process which has been generally successful with the Central Intelligence Bulletin would be beneficial if extended to all current intelligence production. We would contest this. Coordinating the CIB is, relatively, an easy procedure. CIB articles are brief and tend to be largely reportorial. The situation would be quite different were we to attempt to coordinate our memoranda and assessments. Here the approach is basically analytical, with emphasis on interpretation, judgment, and explanation. The product is naturally longer and more involved, cutting across more fields and areas of knowledge. Even in the case of the CIB, coordination frequently delays publication. The delays inherent in coordinating more analytical and speculative items are easy to conceive, and it would in many instances be wrong to describe the product as "current" intelligence. This, we fear with good reason, would apply particularly to those matters of great moment

which are of the deepest concern to the President and the National Security Council, and on which they should be informed with the utmost celerity. Departmental stakes are obviously heaviest in such matters, and there would be "last ditch" efforts to bring the coordinated product into harmony with departmental views.

5. The PFIAB memorandum also appears to assume that the unilateral intelligence issuances of CIA are entirely self-generated. This is emphatically not the case. Much of the product of CIA is done in response to direct requests from the White House and senior officials of the Executive Branch generally. It is noteworthy that many of these items are in fields which the PFIAB would presumably regard as "outside the primary intelligence production responsibility" of CIA. The Secretary of Defense has, for example, asked for intelligence studies on military subjects in order to get an independent analysis of matters of interest to him. Members of the White House Staff rely on CIA for analyses of political developments, not only because such analyses are objective but because they are produced with greater speed than they would be elsewhere. Coordination would tend, of course, to do away with the very qualities for which these intelligence papers are most highly valued by people at the highest levels of Government. If these policy makers feel they need service of this kind from CIA, we can hardly deny it to them.

6. An annex listing representative samples of the kinds of intelligence issuances referred to in the foregoing paragraph is being prepared and will be forwarded to you early next week. We wish to emphasize that CIA tries to anticipate the needs of the policy makers and hence of its own volition produces many items of a similar nature which the world situation and examination of past requests from high level consumers indicate will be needed.

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Deputy Director for Intelligence

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